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abrasion amounted to almost a polish,.at once 
bringing to mind the published descriptions of 
the cutting, polishing and sometimes complete 
destruction of tree trunks in portions of the 
southwest by flying sand. 
To clearly show the entire possibility of the 
abrasion in this case being due to flying snow 
or sleet, I would state that the woodland 
wherein the phenomena was noticed is very 
open, of scattering growth and constitutes the 
northwestern border of a forest of small ex- 
tent, having an open exposure to the westward 
of upwards of a mile. Thus the prevailing 
westerly winds, which rage with tremendous 
severity at  times through this open tract, are 
able during the winter to hurl and sift through 
this thin forest growth tons of snow and icy 
sleet. This is evidenced by the enormous snow- 
banks which yearly form in the forest, at a 
little distance from its margins, in short, a t  the 
point where the wind by meeting repeated re- 
sistance loses its carrying power. This line of 
deposit varies, governed by the surface contour 
and variable density of forest growth. 
Possibly the phenomenon described has been 
noticed and published before, but having access 
to considerable literature on forestry, I have 
never as yet met with any account, hence this 
slight contribution which may be of interest to 
some of the readers of SCIENCE. 
PERCYM. VAN EPPS. 
GLENVILLE,N. Y. 
THE PUMA, OR MOUNTAIN LION. 
DURINGlast July and August I was encamped 
with my family up on the Strait of San Juan de 
Fuca, near Port Williams, Clallam county, about 
thirty miles west of Port Townsend. One after- 
noon, while my children, with their nurse, were 
playing upon the beach in front of our cabin, a 
mountain lion (Felis concolor Linn.) came down 
through a strip of woods to the low bank over- 
looking the beach, and gave utterance to a most 
frightful cry or scream. I hastened out, calling 
loudly, and the commotion made by myself, 
wife, children and nurse, frightened away the 
brute. Although I had a Winchester repeating 
rifle in the cabin, I was unable to attempt to get 
a shot, by reason of a severe illness with which 
I had been prostrated for several weeks. I 
heard this wild cry repeated several times after 
wards, but each time farther away in the forest. 
About two years before a Mr. Travis, a 
rancher, living near our camp, was returning 
home after dark, on horseback, and was chased 
by a lion. The horse fled in terror along the 
trail through the forest, never stopping until 
reaching home. Mr. Travis thinks that the at- 
tack was incited by a small dog that accom- 
panied him, rather than upon himself or his 
horse. He returned the next morning to the 
locality with several hunting dogs and succeeded 
in shooting the animal, which proved to be a 
very large specimen, measuring eight feet from 
tip to tip. The lions are comparatively plenti- 
ful in all wild and thinly sectled portions of the 
State. 
I have written this sketch at  the suggestion 
of Mr. Frederick W. True, of the Smithsonian 
Institution, author of an interesting illustrated 
paper on (The Puma or American Lion,' pub- 
lished under the auspices of the Institution in 
1891. In this paper Mr. True refers to a con- 
flict of authorities in regard to the cries or 
screams of the animal, and also in regard to its 
belligerency, or rather, possibly, its timidity. 
MERIDEN S. HILL, 
Corresponding Secretary, Tacoma Academy of 
Science. 
TACOMA, February 13, 1896.WASHINGTON, 
LOGIC AND THE RETINAL IMAGE. 
WHILE admitting that all the physiological an- 
tecedents to the sensation of vision are entirely 
outside the bounds of our experience in the use 
of eyes, your correspondent, C. L. F. (SCIENCE, 
February 7,1896, p. 201), and many others who 
have written to this journal on the subject dur- 
ing the last six months, object to my assertion 
that I find one of these phenomena inconceivable; 
and they treat my statement that I cannot 
conceive that the image on my retina is upside 
down, as if I had said that I could conceive of 
the image if it were anything else than upside 
down. 
If for purposes of illustration I declare my 
conviction that the moon is not made of green 
cheese, what are we to think of the 'logic ' 
which interprets this as an assertion that it is 
made of cheese, although this is not green ? I 
can see no better logical warrant for attribut- 
ing to me the opinion that I can conceive of the 
retinal image, but not of its inversion ; for, most 
~ s u r e d l y ,I have said nothing of the sort, and 
I find all the physiological antecedents to vision 
equally inconceivable. 
If something in the minds of certain writers 
leads them to believe that I adhere to an obso- 
lete and worthless hypothesis of vision I am 
helpless, for while I have the right to demand 
that my words shall pass at their face value I 
have no way to defend this right except an ap- 
peal to unprejudiced readers. 
I cannot conceive of the antipodes, and if 
C. L. F. infers that I accept the astronomy of 
Homer I must bear up as well as I can. 
Both the rotundity of the earth and the in- 
version of the retinal image are proved by am- 
ple evidence, but apprehension of the proof of 
a truth is a very different thing from conception 
of the truth itself, and no one who is not totally 
destitute of imagination could confuse the one 
with the other ; although it may be well to re- 
mind C. L. I?. that I have nowhere said that 
there is anything which needs explanation in 
the fact that the image on the retina is inverted,' 
and that it is because the evidence is  conclusive 
that I made use of the inversion to illustrate 
that great law of logic that ' the test of truth is  
evidence and not conceivability. ' (SCIENCE,Oct. 4, 
1895.) 
If any reader cares to ask what has called 
forth all this criticism, which has occupied the 
pages of SCIENCE for more than six months, he 
may be surprised to find that my statement about 
the retinal image was nothing more than an in- 
cidental illustration of less than a dozen words in 
an article in SCIENCE, October 4,1895, in which 
I tried to show that ' the mental vice to which 
we are most prone is our tendency to believe 
that lack of evidence for an opinion is a reason 
for believing something else. " 
The correspondence which this illustration 
has excited seems to show that I should have 
done well to state this truth in a more general 
form, and to point out that the mental vice to 
which we are most prone is our tendency to in- 
terpret a negation as an affirmation of some-
thing else. 
W. K. BROOKS. 
CERTITUDES AND ILLUSIONS. 
To THE EDITOROF SCIENCE: In  my first 
article on l Certitudes and Illusions,' I cited 
two illustrious examples of persons who had 
lapsed into reification, namely, Spencer in his 
'First Principles, ' where he reifies force, and 
Hegel in his Logic where he reifies idea or com- 
prehension ; but I did not attempt to exhibit 
Spencer's reification of force or Hegel's reifica- 
tion of idea. In that article I tried to set forth 
the nature of the subject-matter of a series of 
articles which I had planned and promised the 
editor. 
Fichte has seized upon certain of Kant's 
reifications and those of others and reasoned 
about non-existent abstractions or pure proper- 
ties of mind, and in his presptation has naively 
reduced the whole method of reasoning to an 
absurdity ; but he died a disappointed and sad 
man because he had not consciously discovered 
that he had murdered his own methods. Hegel 
seems to have discovered this and to have char- 
acterized pure abstraction in no unmeasured 
terms, notwithstanding which he finally fell in- 
to the same vice and reified idea. In  my first 
article Hegel's illusion was not set forth, but 
only reference made to the matter for the pur- 
pose of calling attention to the subject-matter 
of which I wish to treat. I shall not ignore or 
underestimate Spencer's contribution to the 
biology of the lower animals nor his contribu- 
tion to psychology. In the same manner I 
shall not underestimate Hegel's acute reasoning 
in his system of logic, but I shall attempt to 
show that Hegel accepts Kant's doctrine of 
antinomies and develops this doctrine into a 
logic of contradiction and by its use reifies idea 
and ends as an absolute idealist. Now, Mr. 
Editor, permit me to say this word in reply to 
Prof. Royce, whose letter is in every way kind, 
but whose error consists in supposing that I 
attributed to Hegel all of the reifications men- 
tioned in my article. 
If he will take down the Phanomenologie des 
Geistes and read in the first chapter what Hegel 
has said about the demonstratives, and then read 
what I have said about them, he will discover 
to what I had reference in the treatment and 
use of these demonstratives, and maybe he will 
further discover that I have a purpose in speak- 
